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世界金融危机英文怎么说？？？
world financial crisis
例句:
马来西亚受世界金融危机，世界石油价格下跌以及本国长时间经济萧条的共同影响，经历了一段金融动荡/困难时期。
Malaysia has undergone financial difficulties from the combined impact of the world financial crisis, decline in world oil prices and its own prolonged recession
哭求,如何解决金融危机 英文版
How to Solve the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis deepens. The bailouts are piecemeal and national, whereas the crisis is global. What’s worse, the policy responses are not based on a clear diagnosis of the underlying problem.
Some politicians talk as if this crisis were merely about illiquidity: banks don’t have enough liquid assets to meet their current obligations. If this were so, the problem would already have been solved. The reason is that most countries have three institutions in place that generally prevent this sort of thing from happening: (1) central banks that are “lenders of last resort”, (2) depositors are insured (up to a specified maximum) and (3) banks are regulated and supervised.
But the problem now is different. Once we understand it, we are close to finding a solution. It is not just a matter of potential illiquidity, but also of potential insolvency: the total assets of many financial institutions could fall short of their total liabilities. At the current fire-sale asset prices, they’re in danger of going broke. The central banks can’t help here, since they lend only for short periods against highly-rated collateral.
The difficulty is that some of the troubled financial institutions are too large too fail (their demise would wipe out too much wealth, shut down too many businesses, throw too many people into unemployment) and are very contagious (their bankruptcy would lead to the bankruptcy of other large institutions). That is why we’ve seen lots of case-by-case bailouts (Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae und Freddi Mac, Fortis, Bradford and Bingley, Wachovia, Glitnir, etc.), climaxing in the largest, the Paulson plan.
We know how we got into this mess. In very broad brush strokes, it happened like this: (a) Due explicit and implicit state guarantees to banks and their creditors, as well as a lamentable lack of associated regulation, banks faced low costs of risk. So, predictably, they invested in increasingly risky assets, such as subprime mortgage loans. (b) Due to low interest rates, banks faced low costs of borrowing. Thus they became highly leveraged. This meant that even a slight decline in their assets could destroy lots of their equity. (c) Like the regular banking sector, the “shadow banking sector” (money market funds, hedge funds, investment funds, private equity firms, suppliers of commercial paper, insurers such as AIG) funded its short-term liabilities with long-term assets, but the latter faced far less regulation. The result of “regulatory arbitrage,” moving risky business to where it is least regulated.
The rest is history: When the housing bubble burst, the value of mortgage-backed securities fell, and this left many financial institutions with too little capital relative to their debt. Thus they sold whatever assets they could (not just the mortgage-backed securities) and this drove asset prices down further, extending the problem to other financial institutions. With the exception of the Paulson plan, governments have responded to this crisis in a piecemeal fashion, deciding about one institution at a time (Bear Stearns yes, Lehman no). This raised investor uncertainty, leading to a general panic that spread to the money market funds.
If you agree that this is basically the problem, then a solution to this financial crisis is, in my judgment, could run along the following lines. Just as the problem of potential illiquidity can be addressed by “lenders of last resort” (the central banks), so the problem of potential insolvency can be tackled by “buyers of last resort.” The latter are the treasuries and finance ministries that can buy shares or warrants in the troubled financial institutions, thereby providing them with capital they have been lacking. Of course this capital infusion would have to come with additional regulation and supervision.
This sort of solution has been staring us in the face for some time. The broad idea was applied to the recent string of troubled institutions (Fannie and Freddie, AIG, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Bradford and Bingley, Fortis, etc.). The U.S. government used it to get out of the savings-and-loans crisis of the early 1980s, as did the Swedish government to overcome its financial crisis of 1992. All we need to do now, in this world of global finance, is make it a reliable pillar of our global financial architecture.
Under my proposed solution, each government should establish a trust company that identifies the highly contagious (alias “systemically significant”) financial institutions which cannot be allowed to fail. These institutions receive a solvency insurance and, in return, become bound by new regulatory requirements. For example, the institutions could be required to retain a 10 percent stake in their securitized products and to publicize higher stakes they may hold. In addition, the trust company could require debt-for-equity swaps for institutions with excessively high leverage ratios. Thereby the institutions would reduce their liabilities relative to their assets, with the immediate expense shared by the shareholders and taxpayers. Finally, the trust company would have the duty to sell its stakes in these institutions within the next decade, with the sole objective of maximizing the taxpayers’ return.
Since both the regular and shadow banking sectors contain highly contagious financial institutions, both should receive comparable regulation and supervision. This is necessary to avoid regulatory arbitrage. But in this financially interdependent world, regulatory arbitrage is an international phenomenon. The only way to overcome it is through international coordination. As an important step in this direction, coordination among E.U. governments is essential. What is required is a harmonized institutional mechanism – through a central agency or a consortium of existing institutions – to coordinate and oversee the regulatory and supervisory activities of countries, monitor global financial risks, implement a globally integrated financial early warning system, and coordinate internationally the obligations of the buyers of last resort.
In the longer run, the world community should strive to perform these functions through a global monetary agency.
We can be under no illusions: providing solvency insurance is potentially dangerous, since the insured institutions have an almighty incentive to take excessive risks. This is the reason why the concomitant regulation and supervision, coordinated internationally, is so important. As it is, governments are bailing out one troubled institution after another, but often without the regulatory and supervisory safeguards. This creates serious problems for the future.
In short, the solution can be summarized in one sentence: Just as we have overcome the problem of potential systemic illiquidity through a lender of last resort plus deposit insurance regulation and supervision, so we must now overcome the problem of potential systemic insolvency through a buyer of last resort plus solvency insurance, debt-to-equity swaps, regulation and supervision.
This solution above requires courage, which is exactly what these dangerous times demand. The present financial crisis is truly global, requiring a globally coordinated response. Saving one financial institution at a time, each country for itself, can’t solve the problem. On the contrary, it would spread more uncertainty and fear, which would further undermine the global financial system. If we all had the assurance that a new world financial order was in place – that not only defended us from contagious illiquidity through lenders of last resort, but also protected us from contagious insolvency through buyers of last resort – then the widespread fear and distrust in financial markets would dissipate. Confidence could return and thereby the dangers of illiquidity and insolvency of the major financial institutions would recede. We all know that international cooperation is difficult. But as we look into the abyss, contemplating the possibility that the life savings of hundreds of millions could disappear as jobs and businesses are destroyed around the world, it should be clear to all major heads of state, all policy makers and voters, that we must grasp our responsibility to implement the required globally cooperative response.
求全球金融危机的英文报告，要2000字
2008全球金融危机 The Global Financial Crisis Of 2008
by Nicholas A. Vardy
Here we are yet again in the midst of another "global economic crisis." From the hilltops of Davos, Switzerland, Morgan Stanley's permabear Stephen Roach has shouted warnings of potential economic "Armageddon." Superinvestor George Soros designated the current state of the global economy "the worst market crisis in 60 years." Bill Clinton labeled it "the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression" —— even as global stocks responded by slumping 7.7% in January —— the worst start to an investing year since Morgan Stanley began publishing data in the 1970s.
But before you liquidate your financial assets, buy gold bullion, and move to a cave in Montana, you may wish to consider that current predictions of global economic collapse may be simply hyperbole. It has happened before. Clinton's quote above actually refers to the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 —— right before NASDAQ clocked an 88% gain in 1999. Nor does this global crisis stand up to the scrutiny of historic comparison. Remember the SL crisis in the early '80s? It cost the U.S. economy about 3.5% of GDP —— about 5x the size of subprime write-offs so far. Or how about the dark days of 1981, when the Federal Reserve drove its key interest rate to 19% in an effort to whip inflation? Bill Clinton's "Great Depression of 1998" doesn't even merit mention.
Global Financial Crisis: The Current State of Play
Comparing economic statistics is inevitably a "glass is half empty" versus "glass is half full" kind of game. Both Pollyannas and Cassandras can marshal endless statistics to support their version of events. But since it's the Cassandras' views that are the flavor of the day, let's look at some "glass is half full" statistics on the U.S. economy.
Companies in the U.S. private sector added 130,000 jobs in January and the unemployment rate eased to 4.9%. The Institute for Supply Management's index of manufacturing activity rose to 50.7 in January —— back above the 50 threshold that indicates expansion consistent with GDP growth of roughly 2%. Nearly 93% （!） of purchasing managers said that turmoil in financial markets was having no effect on their companies' ability to obtain regular or additional financing. That situation indicates that the turmoil is restricted to Wall Street and subprime households.
True, that after rip roaring performances in Q2 and Q3, the U.S. economy has stumbled. But a look behind the headline numbers is revealing. Good news came from the consumer sector （spending increased by 2%）, business investment （jumping 7.5%）, and exports （up 3.9%）. It was declines in residential investment （down 23.9%） and in inventory investment that almost wiped out those gains. All of this indicates that the economy stands less at the precipice of the next Great Depression than at a cyclical purging of excesses —— particularly in the housing sector.
Global Financial Crisis: Professor Bernanke's Report Card
Aware that the financial crisis could spread to other sectors, the Fed has moved remarkably aggressively, cutting rates by 1.25 percentage points in eight days —— a rate-cutting spree almost unheard of in central banking history. The Fed now has cut rates five times by a cumulative 2.25 percentage points —— and there is no sign that the Fed is done. Thanks to the maneuverings of Hank Paulson, George Bush soon will sign a bill that will pump some $150 billion into the American economy for U.S. consumers to spend. That kind of coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities is as unprecedented as it is both prompt and impressive.
Sure, the Cassandras are vilifying the Fed's actions. Bernanke has been criticized for everything from pandering to Wall Street traders to still being behind the curve. But opinions are like a nose —— everybody has one. The current din of criticism against Bernanke is a lot like baseball fans, screaming "throw the bum out" at the game or venting their frustrations on post-game AM radio talk shows. But it's a lot easier to criticize than to step up to home plate and swing the bat. The reality is that few of Bernanke's most vitriolic critics were even smart enough to make it into an introductory economics class taught by Bernanke at Princeton —— let alone to run the world's most influential Central Bank. And to assume that Fed policy is based on responses to such criticism would be as absurd as for baseball star Alex Rodriguez to walk over and hand his bat to an obnoxious, beer-swilling critic in the bleachers of Yankee Stadium to take his place at home plate. Thankfully, airline pilots guiding a plane through rough turbulence play to a less vociferous crowd.
Here's the reality. Neither Bernanke's interest rate cuts nor the federal stimulus package likely will hit the policy nail right on the head. But no real-time decision making is perfect. As John Maynard Keynes, himself an academic with plenty of real world experience, observed: "It's better to be approximately right than exactly wrong." The Fed can't stop a downturn, but it can help it be short and shallow. This is a complex, fast-changing situation. Let's give the Fed and the U.S. government some credit for acting swiftly and decisively.
Global Financial Crisis: The Investment Strategy of the World's Top Traders
So are things really that bad? What has gotten lost in the din is that credit markets have returned to normal. Foreclosures are at record levels, but aren't as numerous as originally forecast. And even if policy responses by the Fed only slow the rate of decline in U.S. housing prices, that alone will already have a dramatic impact on U.S. economic growth. And the Fed has shown that it is willing to act quickly to reverse course and hike interest rates once it is clear that the economy is through this bout of weakness.
Uncertainty means that it is reasonable to pull your horns in a bit —— and diversify away from stocks, emphasizing a diverse group of assets that are less correlated to the stock market. The top hedge managers I know are more focused on playing defense until the dust settles. The most bullish signal is that investors are almost uniformly bearish. And it is precisely during periods of panic that the greatest fortunes are made.
标签：2008全球金融危机, The Global Financial Crisis Of 2008, 金融危机英语
面临全球金融危机，市场需求锐减，订单减少，怎么英语翻译
Facing the global financial crisis, the sharp drop in market demand, reduced orders, the companies are looking for in the economic environment to survive the crisis, development, and the way in an invincible position.
不知道怎么样！！